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I. INTRODUCTION
In three cases decided in the 1990s, the U.S. Supreme Court
greatly expanded the discretion of trial judges to admit expert tes-
timony.I This trilogy requires that trial judges function as gate-
keepers by imposing an obligation on judges to screen all expert
witness testimony and to refuse entry to experts who offer opinions
that are unreliable or unhelpful. The first case in the trilogy, Dau-
bert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals,2 established the gatekeeper obli-
gation and applied it to science-based expert testimony. In the
second case, General Electric Co. v. Joiner, the Court made clear that
trial courts, not appellate courts, stand at the gate. Finally, in the
third case, Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael,4 the Court expanded
the gatekeeper role to include all proposed expert testimony, not
just testimony grounded in science.
t Associate General Counsel, University of Minnesota; J.D., 1986, George-
town University Law Center, magna cum laude, Order of the Coif, B.A., University
of Minnesota, 1983, with distinction.
1. See infra notes 2-4 and accompanying text.
2. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
3. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
4. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
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Prior to Daubert, many courts often deferred to the scientific
community when deciding which opinions to admit into evidence.5
The Court's insistence that trial judges, not scientists, determine
which evidence is admissible should not be viewed as extraordi-
6nary. Trial judges are vested with the authority for determining
which evidence is admissible, a duty imposed by the modern-day
rules of evidence. Nonetheless, the Minnesota Supreme Court has
not expressly adopted the gatekeeping obligation recognized in the
Daubert trilogy. This article will argue that the Minnesota Supreme
Court should adopt this obligation. Part II of this article describes• 8
the Daubert trilogy; Part III discusses Minnesota law concerning
admissibility of expert witness testimony;9 Part IV discusses the need
for change in Minnesota; ° and Part V offers guidance for Minne-
sota lawyers, assuming that the trilogy is adopted."
II. THE TRILOGY
A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals
Before 1993, several courts, including the Minnesota Supreme
Court, 2 followed the standard for admissibility of expert testimony
announced in Fye v. United States.13 This standard dictated that ex-
pert testimony was admissible if the methodology or testing under-
lying the expert's opinion was generally accepted in the relevant
5. If the opinion was grounded in methodology that the scientific commu-
nity had accepted, the opinion was admissible. See discussion infra Part II (discuss-
ing admissibility under the standard announced in Frye v. United States, 293 F.
1013 (App. D.C. 1923)), and Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585 (noting that majority of
courts followed this standard for assessing admissibility of expert testimony).
6. As noted Jurist Benjamin Cardozo wrote long ago, judges and scientists
have much in common: "The work of a judge is in one sense enduring and in an-
other ephemeral.... In the endless process of testing and retesting, there is a
constant rejection of the dross and a constant retention of whatever is pure and
sound and fine." Daubert, 509 U.S. at 597 n.13 (quoting BENJAMIN CARDOZO, THE
NATURE OF THEJUDICIAL PROCESS 178, 179 (1921)).
7. See, e.g, MINN. R. EVID. 104(a) (noting that the trial judge is to resolve is-
sues of admissibility of evidence); FED. R. EVID. 104(a) advisory committee's notes
(noting that "[a]ccepted practice, incorporated in the rule, places on the judge
the responsibility" for deciding questions of admissibility of evidence).
8. See infra Part IIA-C.
9. See infra Part 111.
10. See infra Part IV.
11. See infra Part V.
12. See, e.g., State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764, 768 (Minn. 1980).
13. 293 F. 1013 (App. D.C. 1923).
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scientific community. 4 The Court changed the rule in 1993 with
Daubert-at least with respect to federal courts.
In Daubert, plaintiffs argued that Bendectin, a drug marketed
by defendant, caused birth defects for which plaintiffs sought com-
pensation. 5 Plaintiffs offered testimony from eight experts, "each
of whom ... possessed impressive credentials" to support the the-
ory that Bendectin caused plaintiffs' injuries. 16 The trial court ex-
cluded this expert opinion evidence because the methodology
supporting the opinions did not rise to the level of general accep-
tance.' The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, citing
Frye.1 8 While the Ninth Circuit and a majority of circuits followed
Frye,19 the Third Circuit rejected it, concluding that the Frye stan-
dard "was too vague and malleable to yield consistent results, and
because its nose-counting emphasis often led to the exclusion of
helpful evidence in contradiction to the spirit of the Rules of Evi-
dence. 20 The U.S. Supreme Court granted certiorari in Daubert to
resolve this conflict.2 '
14. See id. The Frye court articulated the standard this way:
Just when a scientific principle or discovery crosses the line between the
experimental and demonstrable stages is difficult to define. Somewhere
in this twilight zone the evidential force of the principle must be recog-
nized, and while courts will go a long way in admitting expert testimony
deduced from a well-recognized scientific principle or discovery, the
thing from which the deduction is made must be sufficiently established
to have gained general acceptance in the particular field in which it be-
longs.
Id. at 1014. In Frye, defendant took a "deception test" and proffered as an expert
the scientist who administered the test. See id. at 1013. The prosecution objected
and the trial court sustained the objection. See id. at 1014. On appeal, the court
found that the "systolic blood pressure deception test," an early version of the lie
detector test, had not "gained such standing and scientific recognition among
physiological and psychological authorities...." Id. Accordingly, the proffered
testimony was not admissible. See id.
15. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).
16. See id. at 583.
17. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 727 F. Supp. 570, 572-76 (S.D.
Cal. 1989), affd, 951 F.2d 1128 (9th Cir. 1991), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
18. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 951 F.2d 1128, 1129 (9th Cir.
1991), rev'd, 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
19. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585; see also United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d 1191,
1195 (8th Cir. 1993) (noting at that time that a majority of circuits adhered to
Frye).
20. DeLuca v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 911 F.2d 941, 955 (3rd Cir. 1990)
(citing United States v. Downing, 753 F.2d 1224, 1236-37 (3rd Cir. 1995)).
21. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 585.
2000]
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The Court held that the adoption of the Federal Rules of Evi-
dence, specifically Rule 702,22 does not leave room for the Frye
test. 2 Analyzing Rule 702 much like a statute, the Court noted that
"[t]he drafting history makes no mention of Frye, and a rigid 'gen-
eral acceptance' requirement would be at odds with the 'liberal
thrust' of the Federal Rules and their 'general approach of relaxing
the traditional barriers to "opinion" testimony.' 24  The Court
noted that there were limits on the admissibility of expert testi-
mony and that the trial judge should "screen[] such evidence...
[to] ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admit-
ted is not only relevant, but reliable."25 This gatekeeper obligation
arises from Rule 702 "which clearly contemplates some degree of
regulation of the subjects and theories about which an expert may
testify.",26
In rejecting the Frye test, the Court also discussed alternative
27
ways to assess expert testimony. The Court described a flexible
standard and offered four factors to examine when assessing the
reliability of the testimony: (1) whether the theory or technique re-
lied upon has been or can be tested; (2) "whether the theory or
technique has been subjected to peer review and publication;" (3)
"the potential rate of error" and "the existence and maintenance of
standards controlling the technique's operation;" and (4) an ex-
amination of the "particular degree of acceptance" of the theory or
technique within the relevant community.
Daubert substantially altered the way in which expert testimony
was analyzed, leading to extensive commentary.29 After Daubert, ap-
22. See FED. R. EVID. 702 ("[I]f scientific, technical, or other specialized
knowledge will assist the trier of fact to understand, a witness qualified as an ex-
pert may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise.").
23. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.
24. Id. at 588 (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169
(1988)).
25. Id. at 589.
26. Id.; see also Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., Inc., 97 F.3d 293, 296-97 (8th
Cir. 1996) "The Supreme Court in Daubert makes it plain that the trial court is to
act as a gatekeeper in screening such testimony for relevance and reliability, that
is, make an assessment whether the reasoning and methodology underlying the
testimony is scientifically valid." Id. (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591-93).
27. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 592-93.
28. See id. at 593-94.
29. For example, see Peter B. Knapp, Alchemy, Evidence, and Expert, 51 BENCH
& B. MINN. 21 (Aug. 1994), and Joseph R. Meaney, From Fye to Daubert: Is a Pattern
Unfolding, 35 JURIMETRICSJ. 191 (1995), for early discussions of the impact of Dau-
bert. See also Eileen Gay Jones, Gatekeeping Soothsayers, Quacks and Magicians: Defin-
[Vol. 26:1
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pellate courts also were left with an opening to modify the abuse of
discretion standard of review used to examine decisions on the
admissibility of expert testimony.30  The Court, however, quickly
closed this window with the second case in the trilogy, General Elec-
tric Co. v. Joiner.31
B. General Electric Co. v. Joiner
The appellate court in Joiner adopted the stringent standard of
review because it perceived that the Court ruled in Daubert that
there was an implicit preference in the Federal Rules of Evidence
for admitting expert testimony. 2 The Court disagreed with this in-
terpretation. The Federal Rules of Evidence might be construed to
allow a trial court to admit "a somewhat broader range of scientific
testimony than would have been admissible under Frye,"33 but that is
not justification for altering the traditional standard of review that
applied to issues of admissibility. The Court reasoned that allowing
appellate courts to subject the issue of admissibility of expert testi-
mony to a more stringent standard of review is inconsistent with the
gatekeeping role of trial courts set forth in Daubert.34 The Court re-
affirmed that the appropriate standard of review for issues of ad-
missibility of expert testimony was abuse of discretion and that this
standard applied to decisions to admit or exclude expert testi-
35mony.
Chief Justice Rehnquist set the stage for the third part of the
trilogy in his partial dissent in Daubert when he asked whether the
standard offered by the majority would apply to "an expert seeking
to testify on the basis of 'technical or other specialized knowl-
ing Science in the Courtroom, 25 WM. MrrCHELL L. REv. 315, 316-17 (1999) (reviewing
KENNETH R FOSTER & PETER W. HUBER, Judging Science: Scientific Knowledge and the
Federal Courts (1997)) (discussing the impact of Daubert).
30. Compare Joiner v. General Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 529 (11th Cir. 1996)
(applying a "particularly stringent standard of review" to the trial judge's exclusion
of expert testimony), rev'd, 522 U.S. 136 (1997), and In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB
Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 750 (3rd Cir. 1994) (applying a "more stringent review" of de-
cisions on admissibility of expert testimony) with Duffee v. Murray Ohio Mfg. Co.,
91 F.3d 1410, 1411 (10th Cir. 1996) (applying abuse of discretion standard) and
Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc., 75 F.3d 290, 292-93 (7th Cir. 1996) (applying abuse of
discretion standard).
31. 522 U.S. 136 (1997).
32. See Joiner, 78 F.3d at 529.
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edge'-the other types of expert knowledge to which Rule 702 ap-
plies-or are the 'general observations' limited only to 'scientific
knowledge?' 36 Debate ensued17 until the Court decided Kumho Tire
Co., Ltd. v. Carmichae s
C. Kumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael
In Kumho Tire, plaintiffs sued a tire manufacturer and distribu-
tor for injuries suffered when their minivan overturned after a rear
tire blew out. 9 Plaintiffs alleged that a defect in a tire made and
distributed by defendants caused the accident. 4° To support their
theory of causation, plaintiffs proffered testimony from an expertS 41
on tire failure. This expert examined the tire and opined that a
manufacturer's defect caused the blowout.42 Even though the tes-
timony was not based upon scientific knowledge, the trial court
conducted a Daubert analysis and held that the testimony of plain-.• 43
tiffs' expert was not admissible. 4  4
The Eleventh Circuit reversed," applying the de novo standard
to the trial court's conclusion of law that Daubert applied to the ex-
pert testimony at issue.45 The appellate court held that the trial
court erred in applying Daubert to testimony that was not based
upon scientific principles, but upon "skill- or experience-based ob-
36. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 600 (1993) (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
37. Compare Watkins v. Telsmith, Inc., 121 F.3d 984, 990-91 (5th Cir. 1997)
(applying Daubert to testimony that was not based upon scientific knowledge) and
Peitzmeier v. Hennessy Indus., 97 F.3d 293, 296-98 (8th Cir. 1996) with United
States v. Cordoba, 104 F.3d 225, 230 (9th Cir. 1997) ("Daubert applies only to the
admission of scientific testimony."). See also Kristina L. Needham, Questioning The
Admissibility of Nonscientific Testimony After Daubert: The Need for Increased Judicial
Gatekeeping to Ensure the Reliability of All Expert Testimony, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 541,
574 (1998) (advocating the need to scrutinize the reliability of nonscientific testi-
mony by applying Daubert).
38. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999). At the trial level, Kumho Tire was Carmichael v.
Samyang Tire, Inc. The name changed at the appellate level due to a merger of
Kumho Tire and Samyang Tire. See id.
39. See id. at 1171.
40. See id.
41. See id.
42. See id. at 1172.
43. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1514, 1521-22 (S.D. Ala.
1996), rev'd, 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd sub nom. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
44. Carmichael v. Samyang Tire, Inc., 131 F.3d 1433 (11th Cir. 1997), rev'd
sub nom. 119 S. Ct. 1167 (1999).
45. See id. at 1435.
[Vol. 26:1
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servation."46 The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the
"gatekeeping obligation" assigned to trial courts in Daubert applies
to all types of expert testimony.
The Court began its analysis in Kumho Tire, as it had in Daubert,
with the Federal Rules of Evidence. 48 The Court noted that Rule
702 discussed three types of expert testimony-"scientific, technical
or other specialized knowledge, 49-and that the rule made no
"relevant distinction" among the three types. 50 The critical word in
Rule 702 for purposes of the Daubert analysis is the word "knowl-
edge," not the modifiers of "knowledge." 51 Rule 702's requirement
of "knowledge" forms the basis for the standard of reliability ap-
plied in Daubert. Moreover, the "testimonial latitude" granted to
expert witnesses is not limited to those offering testimony based
upon scientific principles.5 3 Finally, the Court noted that "it would
prove difficult, if not impossible, for judges to administer eviden-
tiary rules under which a gatekeeping obligation depended upon a
distinction between 'scientific' knowledge and 'technical' or 'other
specialized' knowledge. There is no clear line that divides one
from the others."54 For all these reasons, the Court held "that Dau-
bert's general principles apply to the expert matters described in
Rule 702."
55
The obligation for trial courts after Kumho Tire is to determine
"whether the testimony has a 'reliable basis in the knowledge and
experience of [the relevant] discipline.' 56 As for the four factors
discussed in Daubert,5 the Court noted that the factors "may or may
not be pertinent in assessing reliability, depending on the nature of
the issue, the expert's particular expertise, and the subject of his
testimony."58 Trial courts are in the best position and must be
46. See id. at 1435-36.
47. See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1171, 1174.
48. See id. at 1174; see also Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 587
(1993) (analyzing the Federal Rules of Evidence).
49. FE. R. EvID. 702.





55. Id. at 1175.
56. Id. (quoting Daubert v. Merrel Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 (1993)).
57. See supra Part II.A. (discussing factors).
58. Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1167 (quoting amicus curiae Brief for United
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given "broad latitude" to decide when those factors might be rele-
vant to assessing reliability and relevancy of a proffered expert's tes-
timony.5 9
III. MINNESOTA'S STANDARD FOR ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY
In Minnesota, the standard for admitting expert testimony var-
ies depending upon the type of testimony offered. If testimony is
based upon expertise grounded in something other than science,
trial courts have wide discretion, limited only by a requirement that
the testimony be helpful to the jury.60
However, if testimony is grounded in scientific principles,
Minnesota courts seem bound by precedent to follow Fye until the
Minnesota Supreme Court rules otherwise. Despite Daubert's accep-
tance and application by all of the federal circuits6' and many of the
59. Seeid.at 1176.
[The standard of discretion for trial courts does not constitute] discre-
tion to abandon the gatekeeping function [and] ... it is not discretion to
perform the function inadequately. Rather, it is discretion to choose
among reasonable means of excluding expertise that is fausse and sci-
ence that is junky. Though, as the Court makes clear today, the Daubert
factors are not holy writ, in a particular case the failure to apply one or
another of them may be unreasonable, and hence an abuse of discretion.
Id. at 1179 (ScaliaJ., concurring) (emphasis omitted).
60. See, e.g., In re Welfare of K.A.S., 585 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998)
("Expert testimony is generally admissible if: '(1) it assists the trier of fact, (2) it
has a reasonable basis, (3) it is relevant, and (4) its probative value outweighs its
potential for prejudice.'") (quoting State v.Jensen, 482 N.W.2d 238, 239 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1992)); Steiner v. Beaudry Oil & Serv., Inc., 545 N.W.2d 39, 44-45 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1996) (expert with 29 years experience in industry properly allowed to de-
scribe standard procedures used in industry and defendant's duty); ZumBerge v.
Northern States Power Co., 481 N.W.2d 103, 108-09 (Minn. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that expert testimony from economist regarding plaintiff's dam-
ages, albeit based upon "unique" methodology, was properly admitted); Hahn v.
Tri-Line Farmers Co-op, 478 N.W.2d 515, 525 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991) (determining
that vocational expert properly allowed to testify "that it is difficult for a person
from a small town to move to Minneapolis for rehabilitation" because such testi-
mony was helpful to the jury); Behlke v. Conwed Corp., 474 N.W.2d 351, 357
(Minn. Ct. App. 1991) ("Once foundation is established and if the trial court de-
termines the specialized knowledge will aid the jury, then a sufficient foundation
for a relevant opinion has been established."); Johnson v. Southern Minn. Mach.
Sales, Inc., 460 N.W.2d 68, 72 (Minn. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that "human factors
engineer" properly was allowed to testify to plaintiffs negligence because testi-
mony assisted jury).
61. See, e.g., Ambrosini v. Labarraque, 101 F.3d 129, 131 (D.C. Cir. 1996);
[Vol. 26:1
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61states that once adhered to Fye, the Minnesota Supreme Court
63has not expressly adopted this standard. In the absence of an ex-
press holding from the Court, Minnesota courts appear bound by
the Fye standard when assessing the admissibility of scientific ex-
United States v. Posado, 57 F.3d 428, 429 (5th Cir. 1995); United States v. Dorsey,
45 F.3d 809, 814 (4th Cir. 1995); United States v. Davis, 40 F.3d 1069, 1072 n.4
(10th Cir. 1994); In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litig., 35 F.3d 717, 732 (3d Cir. 1994);
United States v. Lee, 25 F.3d 997, 998 (11th Cir. 1994); United States v. Sepulveda,
15 F.3d 1161, 1183 (1st Cir, 1993); United States v. Bonds, 12 F.3d 540, 554 (6th
Cir. 1993); United States v. Amador-Galvan, 9 F.3d 1414, 1417-18 (9th Cir. 1993);
Hodges v. Secretary of Dep't of Health and Human Serv., 9 F.3d 958, 966 (Fed.
Cir. 1993); Porter v. Whitehall Lab., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612 (7th Cir. 1993); United
States v. Locascio, 6 F.3d 924, 938 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Martinez, 3 F.3d
1191, 1196 (8th Cir. 1993).
62. See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386 (Alaska 1999); State v. Porter, 698
A.2d 739, 746 (Conn. 1997) (replacing Fye test with Daubert standard); Steward v.
State, 652 N.E.2d 490, 498 (Ind. 1995) ("[A]lthough not binding upon the deter-
mination of state evidentiary law issues, the federal evidence law of Daubert and its
progeny is helpful to the bench and bar in applying Indiana Rule of Evidence
702(b)."); Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995) ("Fed. R.
Evid. 702 and KRE [Kentucky Rules of Evidence] 702 contain the same lan-
guage.... Accordingly, we adopt the standard of review set forth in Daubert.");
State v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993) ("As the Louisiana Code of Evi-
dence provision on expert testimony is identical to the Federal Rules, it follows
that this Court should carefully consider the Daubert decision that soundly inter-
prets an identical provision in the federal law of evidence."); Commonwealth v.
Lanigan, 641 N.E.2d 1342, 1349 (Mass. 1994) ("We accept the basic reasoning of
the Daubert opinion because it is consistent with our test of demonstrated reliabil-
ity."); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203 (N.M. 1993) (rejecting Frye and adopting
Daubert, noting that "New Mexico's Rule 702 is identical to Rule 702 in the Federal
Rules of Evidence"); Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328-330 (Okla. Crim. App.
1995) (replacing Frye test with Daubert standard); State v. Hofer, 512 N.W.2d 482,
484 (S.D. 1994) (replacing Frye test with Daubert standard); State v. Brooks, 643
A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 1993) ("Similar principles [to those discussed in Daubert]
should apply here because Vermont's rules are essentially identical to the federal
ones on admissibility of scientific evidence."); Wilt v. Buracker, 443 S.E.2d 196, 203
(W. Va. 1993) (replacing Frye test with Daubert standard).
63. See Steven Terry, Evidence, 22 WM. MrrCHELu L. REV. 237, 243 (1996) for a
discussion of whether the Minnesota Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Bloom,
516 N.W.2d 159 (Minn. 1994), and Fairview Hosp. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine, 535
N.W.2d 337 (Minn. 1995), might constitute implicit endorsements of Daubert. In
State v. Hodgson, 512 N.W.2d 95 (Minn. 1994), the court held that it need not de-
cide "the issue of what impact Daubert should or will have in Minnesota." See id. at
98. This holding was premised upon the court's conclusion that the testimony at
issue-"basic bite-mark analysis by a recognized expert"-was not "a novel or
emerging type of scientific evidence." Id. However, as the court in Daubert noted,
the requirements of Rule 702 do not apply "exclusively to unconventional evi-
dence." Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 592 n.11 (1993). Thus, it
appears that the court's avoiding the question in Hodgson may have been in error.
This is particularly true in light of the broad applicability of the Daubert standard.
2000]
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pert testimony.64
Most recently, when faced with an issue of admissibility of sci-
entific expert testimony, courts in Minnesota seem to apply both
Frye and Daubert, or avoid determining which standard applies. For
example, in Ross v. Schrantz,5 the plaintiff, a car accident victim, in-
tended to use evidence obtained through quantitative electroen-
cephalography (QEEG) to show that she suffered a closed head in-
jury.66 The trial court excluded the proffered testimony under the
Frye standard. 67  On appeal, plaintiff argued that the trial court
erred because it did not apply Daubert.68 The Minnesota Court of
Appeals disagreed and found that Frye still governed in Minnesota.69
However, the appellate court then assessed the proffered testimony
under Frye and Daubert, concluding that it was inadmissible under
both.70 The court of appeals followed the same dual inquiry in We-
71sely v. Alexander, a medical malpractice case.
64. For a discussion of the Minnesota decisions that examine the applicability
of the Frye standard after Daubert, see Terry, supra note 63, at 243, and Wil Fluegel,
Admissibility of Expert Testimony: Application of Daubert and the Mack/Frye Test, 22
MINN. TRAL LAw, Fall 1997, at 10. One commentator has argued that Daubert
does not reflect much of a change from Minnesota's current practice. See Wilbur
W. Fleugel, Will Daubert Alter Minnesota Practice?, 20 MINN. TRIAL LAw, Winter
1995, at 12 [hereinafter Fluegel I]. Fluegel argues that Minnesota follows a modi-
fied version of the Frye test. First, Minnesota courts consider general acceptance of
the theory or technique underlying the opinion. See Fluegel I at 13. Second, Min-
nesota courts look to determine whether the theory or technique is reliable. See
id. Because Minnesota courts already test reliability, Fluegel suggests that the ap-
plication of Daubert in Minnesota would not be much of a change. See id. at 39.
Missing from the analysis, however, is that in Minnesota, examining reliability
merely is another way of looking for general acceptance by the relevant scientific
community. In State v. Mack, 292 N.W.2d 764 (Minn. 1980), the court considered
whether the scientific community believed that the test was reliable. See id. at 768.
The court stated the test in Minnesota as follows: "[T] he results of mechanical or
scientific testing are not admissible unless the testing has developed or improved
to the point where experts in thefield widely share the view that the results are scien-
tifically reliable as accurate." Id. (emphasis added); see also State v. Schwartz, 447
N.W.2d 422, 424 (Minn. 1989) (holding that the Frye test requires that "experts in
the field generally agree that the evidence is reliable and trustworthy") (emphasis
added). In Daubert, the inquiry is much broader, looking not only to what experts
in the field believe, but to other objective factors reflecting reliability as well. See
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.





70. See id. at *2.
71. No. CO-96-613, 1996 WL 722084 (Minn. Ct. App. Dec. 10, 1996).
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The court of appeals avoided the issue of which standard to
use in Ledin v. State." In that case, defendant sought to overturn
his conviction because the trial court refused to admit polygraph
evidence.7" Polygraph evidence has been excluded in Minnesota
because it does not satisfy Frye.74 Defendant argued that this blan-
ket exclusion no longer was appropriate since the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected Frye in Daubert. With the rejection of Frye, defen-
dant claimed, he at least was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on
76the issue of the admissibility of the polygraph evidence.
The procedural posture of Ledin-affirmance of the conviction
followed by review of the denial of a postconviction petition-al-
lowed the court to apply a standard of review that precluded ruling
whether Daubert should have been applied. In order to receive
post-conviction relief, the court noted that defendant needed to
identify a "novel" theory, one that was not available to him at the
77
time of the appeal of his conviction. Defendant failed to meet
this standard because Daubert was handed down in 1993, two years
78before defendant's trial. Accordingly, the court of appeals
avoided deciding whether the standard was Daubert or Frye.
At least one judge on the court of appeals appears ready to
recognize Daubert's applicability in Minnesota, at least in non-
79scientific cases. In Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc., Judge Short
applied Daubert in her dissenting opinion. s  Plaintiff sought dam-
ages for injuries to his horse while it was boarded at defendant's fa-
cility.81 Specifically, plaintiff alleged that his horse had subsequent
and continuing lameness problems as a result of an accident while, 82
the horse was under defendant's care. Plaintiff supported his83theory of causation with an affidavit from a proposed expert. The
72. No. C7-97-876, 1997WL 757156 (Minn. Ct App. Dec. 9, 1997).
73. See id. at *1.
74. See, e.g., State v. Anderson, 379 N.W.2d 70, 79 (Minn. 1985) (citing Frye
and excluding polygraph evidence based on the ruling in Frye and the decision in
State v. Michaeloff, 324 N.W.2d 926, 927 (Minn. 1992) (holding polygraph test re-
sults inadmissible because there is insufficient evidence of reliability)).
75. See Ledin, No. C7-97-876, 1997 WL 757156, at *1.
76. See id.
77. See id. at "1-2.
78. See id. at *2.
79. No. C4-97-477, 1997 WL 471388 *1 (Minn. Ct. App. Aug. 19, 1997), rev'd,
578 N.W.2d 757 (Minn. 1998).
80. See id. at *6.
81. See id. at *1.
82. See id.
83. See id. at *3.
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trial court ruled that plaintiffs proffered expert was not competent
to render an opinion on causation and granted defendant's motion
for summary judgment.84 The court of appeals reversed, finding
that the trial court "applied too narrow a definition of 'expert' in
its review of... [plaintiffs expert's] qualifications. 85 Rather than
apply Rule 702 narrowly, the court noted that "Minnesota courts
have adopted a broad interpretation of expertise. ,8 Even though
plaintiffs expert was not a veterinarian and had no experience
treating horses for injuries, the court found that she was qualified
87to render an opinion on causation. The majority cited the prof-
fered expert's educational background, her publications and own-
88ership of a horse that experienced a similar injury. This experi-
ence provided the expert with sufficient knowledge to render an
opinion in the case.8 Judge Short disagreed.90 In her dissent,
Judge Short concluded that plaintiff's expert testimony on causa-
tion was nothing more than dressed-up lay testimony based upon
"an inadequate factual foundation."91 Accordingly, the testimony
ran afoul of Daubert's reliability requirement.
92
The Minnesota Supreme Court granted review and agreed
with Judge Short, holding that the trial court properly granted
summary judgment for the defendant.93 The court noted that the
court of appeals applied a de novo standard of review, rather than
the required abuse of discretion standard, to the issue of admissibil-
ity of expert testimony.94 The appellate court's standard of review95
was erroneous. Applying the correct standard of review, the court
84. See id. at *2.
85. Id.
86. Id. at *3.
87. See id. at *4.
88. See id. at *3.
89. See id. at *3-4.
90. See id. at *5-6 (Short, J., dissenting).
91. See id. at *5 (ShortJ, dissenting).
92. See id. at *5 (Short, J., dissenting). Judge Short applied Daubert in a
somewhat similar fashion in writing for the court in Barna v. Commissioner of Pub.
Safety, 508 N.W.2d 220, 222 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (upholding admission of expert
testimony because it met reliability requirement). While the test at issue was
found to be "generally accepted by experts in the field[,]" it could be argued that
the focus of the decision was on the reliability requirement expressed in Daubert.
See id. (citing Daubert) (other citations omitted).
93. See Gross v. Victoria Station Farms, Inc. 578 N.W.2d 757, 761-62 (Minn.
1998).
94. See id. at 761.
95. In this regard, the Court adhered to, without citing, General Elec. Co. v.
Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997). Regarding the second leg of the trilogy, the Minnesota
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sustained the trial court's exclusion of the proffered expert testi-
96
mony. Although the supreme court did not reach Judge Short's
discussion of reliability, implicit in its holding is a conclusion that
before expert testimony will be admissible, it must be supported by
something more than the "ipse dixit of the expert,"97 a conclusion
completely consistent with the reliability requirement in Daubert.
IV. THE CASE FOR CHANGE
Minnesota courts have followed the Frye standard for more
98than forty years. However, "the rule of stare decisis is not an in-
flexible rule of law but rather a policy of the law."99 The doctrine
gives way and earlier decisions are rejected when necessary to
"adapt the law to the ... conditions of the times. . . . "100 Many
Supreme Court long has recognized the broad discretion given to trial courts in
ruling on admissibility of expert testimony. See Benson v. Northern Gopher Enter.,
Inc., 455 N.W.2d 444, 445 (Minn. 1990) ("It has long been the law in this state that
evidentiary rulings, including a decision to exclude expert testimony, lie within the
sound discretion of the trial court.") (citing Detroit Lakes Realty Co. v. Mckenzie,
204 Minn. 490, 493, 284 N.W. 60, 62 (1939)). The breadth of this discretion
means that a trial court's decision will be upheld even though a reviewing court
would have reached a different conclusion, as long as the court has not abused its
"wide latitude." See Benson, 455 N.W.2d at 446. The court of appeals attempted to
restrain the trial court's authority in admissibility of expert testimony by imposing
a requirement that expert testimony on issues of causation be admitted if it proba-
tive. See Benson v. Northern Gopher Enter., Inc., 446 N.W.2d 678, 680 (Minn. C.
App. 1989), rev'd, 455 N.W.2d 444 (Minn. 1990). The supreme court rejected this
attempt to limit the authority of trial judges who were in the best position to
screen the evidence. See Benson, 455 N.W.2d at 446 (holding that "evidentiary
rules demand a case by case analysis, an analysis best left to the trial judge familiar
with the 'setting' of the case").
96. See Gross, 578 N.W.2d at 762 (Minn. 1998) ("The record indicates that
Bennett had no experience in diagnosing equine lameness. Her background does
not include any veterinary science studies, and her work and research has focused
only on horse evolution and conformation rather than equine lameness diagno-
sis.").
97. Joiner, 522 U.S. at 137.
98. See State v. Kolander, 236 Minn. 209, 220, 52 N.W.2d 458, 464 (1952).
99. Johnson v. Chicago, Burlington & Quincy R.R. Co., 243 Minn. 58, 68, 66
N.W.2d 763, 770 (1954).
100. See id. at 771. In Johnson, the court changed Minnesota law by adopting
the doctrine of forum non conveniens. See id. at 776. The rationale in part was that
such a doctrine had been passed to apply to the Federal courts: "In view of the fact
that congress has now adopted the rule of forum non conveniens in connection with
such actions brought in federal court, there seems to be no good reason why we
should not follow the same procedure when such actions are brought in our
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"conditions" have changed in the seventy-five years since Frye was
decided. Perhaps the most important advancement was the adop-
tion of rules of evidence, which set forth standards for courts to use
in assessing the admissibility of evidence.' Minnesota law should
adopt to these changed conditions by expressly rejecting the Frye
test in favor of the Daubert trilogy.
02
One of the most frequent criticisms of the Frye test is that it
precludes the admission of valid, reliable and relevant testimony
merely because the testimony is based upon a technique or test that
has not been around long enough to rise to the level of "general
acceptance. Another criticism is that the Frye test, while pur-
portedly objective, is open to subjective application in that the trial
judge chooses the relevant scientific community in which "general
acceptance" is tested.1' 4 Finally, and perhaps, most importantly, the
Frye test "abdicate [s] judicial responsibility I for determining admis-
sibility to scientists uneducated in the law."05 These valid criticisms
of the Frye test counsel in favor of a new approach.
Other arguments based on the Minnesota Rules of Evidence
support adopting Daubert. Like the federal courts' interpretation of
the Federal Rules of Evidence,0 6 Minnesota courts also recognize
"the approach to a more liberal introduction of evidence as sug-
101. See infra notes 106-17 (discussing Minnesota Rules of Evidence).
102. But see People v. Leahy, 882 P.2d 321, 328-31 (Cal. 1994) (doctrine of stare
decisis required rejecting Daubert in favor of Frye test).
103. See generally MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 203, at 871-73 (John W. Strong
ed., 4th ed. 1992). See also Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 328 n.31 (discussing "sig-
nificant shortcomings" of Frye test, including test's exclusion of "'a new discovery
even though there may be direct experimental or clinical support for the princi-
ple [ ]'" and fact that history has shown that "generally accepted scientific theory is
not always correct") (citing and quoting State v. Bible, 858 P.2d 1157, 1181 (Ariz.
1993)).
104. See, e.g., State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 397 (Alaska 1999):
Nevertheless, the Fye standard has also been criticized for being easily
manipulated by courts when deciding whether to admit certain evidence.
The lack of a definitional framework for "field" and "general acceptance"
allowed courts deciding whether to admit scientific evidence to confine
the "field" of pertinent inquiry narrowly to a specialty within a broader
scientific discipline in order to demonstrate "general acceptance."
Id. at 397 (quoting Jay P. Kesan, An Autopsy of Scientific Evidence in a Post-Daubert
World, 84 GEO. L.J. 1985, 1990 (1996)).
105. Coon, 974 P.2d at 392.
106. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 588 (1993).
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gested by our new rules of evidence adopted in 1977. ",107 The Min-
nesota Rules of Evidence provide at least three sources for adher-
ing to Daubert.10 8 First, like the federal rule, Minnesota Rules of
Evidence 104(a), vests in trial courts the duty to assess the admissi-
bility of evidence.' °9 As other courts have noted, the standards for
judicial reliability and admissibility are not necessarily the same as
the standards used by scientists to test validity.10 Accordingly, it
does not seem appropriate for trial judges to delegate their respon-
sibility under Minnesota Rules of Evidence 104(a) to scientists or
other technical experts."
Second, Minnesota Rules of Evidence 702 counsels in favor of
adopting the trilogy in Minnesota. As the Minnesota Court of Ap-
peals noted, "Daubert's persuasive force in Minnesota may be
strengthened by the fact that our rules of evidence are modeled af-
ter the federal rules." 1 12 This is an understatement. Not only are
Minnesota's rules modeled after the federal counterpart, but Min-
nesota Rules of Evidence 702 is identical to Federal Rules of Evi-
dence 702. Accordingly, the holding in Daubert-that the language
of Federal Rules of Evidence 702 leaves no room for the Frye stan-
dard-inescapably seems to apply to Minnesota Rules of Evidence
702.113 As in other cases, when the federal counterpart is identical
to the Minnesota rule, the Minnesota Supreme Court should rec-
107. County of Ramsey v. Miller, 316 N.W.2d 917, 921 (Minn. 1982).
108. See infra notes 109, 112, 116 and accompanying text.
109. See MINN. R. EVID. 104(a); see also FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
110. See Coon, 974 P.2d at 395-96.
111. See Taylor v. State, 889 P.2d 319, 329 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995) ("In testing
for the admissibility of a particular type of scientific evidence, whatever the scien-
tific 'voting' pattern may be, the courts cannot in any event surrender to scientists
the responsibility for determining the reliability of that evidence.") (quoting
United States v. Williams, 583 F.2d 1194, 1198 (2d Cir. 1978)).
112. State v. Alt, 504 N.W.2d 38, 46 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993), rev'd in part on other
grounds, 505 N.W.2d 72 (Minn. 1993) (citing MINN. R. EVlD. 101 cmt).
113. In Hutton v. State, 663 A.2d 1289 (Md. 1995), the Maryland Court of Ap-
peals considered a similar argument and declined to adopt Daubert. See id. at 1296
n.10. While the Maryland rule on expert testimony was similar to Fed. Rule 702,
the commentary to Maryland's rule articulated that the passage of the rule was not
meant to overrule Maryland's adherence to the Frye test. See id. (citing committee
note to MD. R. EVID. 5-702). The committee comment to MINN. R. EVID. 702 does
not contain a similar endorsement of Fye. See MINN. R. EVID. 702 committee
comment. It could be argued that the comment is much more consistent with
Daubert's emphasis on the role of the trial court than with Frye's general acceptance
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ognize that the federal standard applies."1 4 Indeed, several of the
states that have adopted Daubert have done so because of the simi-
larity of the states' versions of Rule 702 and Federal Rule 702.5
Third, Minnesota Rules of Evidence 703 supports the adoption
of the Daubert standard. Under this rule, for expert testimony to be
admissible, the testimony must be based upon the type of informa-
tion "reasonably relied upon" by others in their field." 6 As the
Alaska Supreme Court noted, this rule "is also a source for an ap-
proach broader than the Frye standard.""
7
Leaving aside criticisms of the Frye standard and the Minnesota
Rules of Evidence, there are many practical reasons for leaving Frye
in the past and looking to the future with the Daubert trilogy. The
Daubert standard recognizes that trial judges, not scientists or tech-
nicians, are best suited to decide what evidence is admissible and
the reason for its admissibility. Trial judges benefit from briefing
by advocates and can request supplemental information as judges
deem appropriate."" Trial judges also have the benefit of repeat-
edly assessing admissibility of expert testimony. From this repeti-
tion, judges develop their own expertise in resolving issues of ad-
missibility."9 Trial judges also may benefit from independently
retained expert assistance under Minnesota Rules of Evidence
706.120
The standard adopted in Daubert also allows a more flexible
and comprehensive inquiry than the Frye standard. This flexibility
is important because science and technology continually evolve.
Trial judges must know of these advancements to ensure that jus-
tice is served.
114. See, e.g., Slater v. Baker, 301 N.W.2d 315, 318 (Minn. 1981) ("Rule
801 (d) (1) (B) of the Minnesota Rules of Evidence is patterned after its counterpart
in the Federal Rules of Evidence. As such the analysis... of Federal Rules of Evi-
dence is instructive.").
115. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Commonwealth, 908 S.W.2d 100, 101 (Ky. 1995); State
v. Foret, 628 So. 2d 1116, 1123 (La. 1993); State v. Alberico, 861 P.2d 192, 203
(N.M. 1993); State v. Brooks, 643 A.2d 226, 229 (Vt. 1993).
116. SeeMINN. R. EVID. 703.
117. State v. Coon, 974 P.2d 386, 393 (Alaska 1999).
118. See id.; State v. Porter, 698 A.2d 739, 748 (Conn. 1997).
119. See Porter, 698 A.2d at 748 ("[A]n important element in adjudication is the
development of judicial expertise through repeated exposure to and familiarity
with similar scientific issues.") (quoting Kesan, supra note 104, at 2038).
120. See MINN. R. EviD. 706(a) (providing mechanism for appointment of ex-
perts to assist trial judge); see also Coon, 974 P.2d at 393 (noting use of independent
experts).
121. See Coon, 974 P.2d at 398; Alberico, 861 P.2d at 201-03.
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Finally, after Kumho Tire, the flexible Daubert standard applies
122
to all types of expert testimony. Minnesota courts do not adhere
to the Frye standard when addressing admissibility of expert testi-
mony that is based upon non-scientific specialized knowledge. As
discussed above, outside the sciences, the principle inquiry seems
to be whether the testimony will be helpful to the jury. The issue
of reliability-at the heart of the Daubert standard-has been held
to go to the weight, not the admissibility of the expert testimony.1
2
5
Adopting the Daubert trilogy ensures that assessment of all expert
testimony in Minnesota is assessed consistent with the gatekeeping
obligation.
One of the purposes in adopting the Minnesota Rules of Evi-
dence, presumably, was to provide uniformity in practice for law-. 126
yers and judges. However, given the Minnesota Supreme Court's
unwillingness to express an opinion on Daubert, trial and appellate
courts are left to apply varying standards for admissibility of expert
testimony. This variation and confusion is inconsistent with the
mandate in Minnesota Rules of Evidence 102 that the rules of evi-
dence be construed to ensure "fairness in administration, [and]
elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay. ,,127 Surely, the
court would comply with this purpose if it announced once and for
all that Daubert and its progeny apply in Minnesota to all types of
expert testimony.
122. See Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1175 (1999) (holding
that the Daubert standard applies to all types of expert testimony).
123. See supra note 60.
124. Seesupra note 60.
125. See State v. Myers, 359 N.W.2d 604, 611 (Minn. 1984) ("The reliability of
expert opinion testimony with regard to the existence or cause of the condition
goes not to the admissibility of the testimony but to its relative weight.") (citing
State v. Langley, 354 N.W.2d 389, 401 (Minn. 1984)).
126. See Preliminary Comment to MINN. R. Evm. (noting the federal rules pro-
vide for uniformity); see also MINN. R. EVID. 102 (discussing purpose of rules of evi-
dence).
127. See MINN. R. EVID. 102.
128. For those who fear that application of the Daubert standard will open the
floodgates to expert testimony, the opinion in Daubert on remand needs to be ex-
amined. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43 F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir.
1995). On remand, the opinions still were excluded as unreliable. See id. at 1321.
The court concluded that the opinions did not satisfy either of the requirements
of Rule 702. See id. The opinions were not "scientific knowledge" because they
were not based upon independent research, had not been the subject of peer re-
view and were not accompanied by any other external source to validate the
methodology used by the experts. See id. at 1317-19. The court concluded that it
had "been presented with only the experts' qualifications, their conclusions and
20001
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V. APPLICATION OF THE TRILOGY
Assuming that the Minnesota Supreme Court is presented with
the proper case and expressly adopts the trilogy, a discussion of
what Minnesota practitioners can expect is appropriate. Under
Daubert, as interpreted by Kumho Tire, the role of the trial court is to
determine "that any and all [expert] testimony or evidence admit-
ted is not only relevant, but reliable."'29 Minnesota's Rule of Evi-
dence 702 supplies the framework for this determination. The rule
provides: "If scientific, technical or other specialized knowledge
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to deter-
mine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an expert by knowledge,
skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto in the
form of an opinion or otherwise."' 3° Daubert should be the guide in
interpreting this rule.
According to Daubert, the rule imposes two requirements.
First, the testimony at issue must relate to scientific or other special-
ized knowledge. 13 2 The modifiers to "knowledge" in Rule 702 (sci-
entific, technical or other specialties) "impl[y] a grounding in the
methods and procedures of" the relevant subject matter. 3 3 And, the
word "knowledge" in the rule "connotes more than subjective belief
or unsupported speculation.",3 4 To qualify as "knowledge" under
the rule, an expert's opinion must be "supported by appropriate
validation-i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known.' 3 5 The
first requirement then "establishes a standard of evidentiary reli-
ability." 36
Second, Rule 702 requires that the proffered expert's testi-
their assurances of reliability. Under Daubert, that's not enough." Id. at 1319. As
for the second prong of Rule 702, the court concluded that it was not satisfied be-
cause the experts testified only that Bendectin was "capable of causing" birth de-
fects. See id. at 1320. The experts did not opine that Bendectin caused the birth
defects at issue in the case, or that the drug more than doubled the risk of birth
defects. See id. at 1322. Accordingly, the court concluded the opinions would not
be helpful to the jury. See id. at 1320-22.
129. Daubertv. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 589 (1993).
130. MINN. R. EVID. 702.
131. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-91. These areas arise from the screening re-
quirements in FED. R. EvID. 104(a). Minnesota's counterpart is identical. See
MINN. R. EVID. 104(a).
132. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
133. See id.
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mony be of assistance to the jury in understanding the evidence or
in determining a fact.13 7  "This condition goes primarily to rele-
vance," and "requires a valid scientific connection to the pertinent• • .138
inquiry" at hand. The careful Minnesota lawyer then must pre-
pare in both areas.
The analysis in the last two cases in the trilogy provide impor-
tant illustrations regarding the scrutiny applied to expert testimony
if the trilogy is adopted. In Joiner, the Court concluded that the
trial court did not abuse its discretion in excluding the testimony.
13 9
The experts planned to testify that plaintiffs injury (lung cancer)
was caused by his exposure to polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs)
manufactured by defendant. 40 The testimony was based on tests
conducted on animals and four epidemiological studies. 141 The
Court reviewed these studies and concluded that the trial court did
not abuse its discretion in finding that the tests did not provide an
appropriate basis upon which to ground expert testimony that ex-
posure to PCBs caused plaintiffs cancer.142 The conclusion that the
testimony was not admissible seems to be grounded in a failure to
satisfy the first requirement of Rule 702.
Kumho Tire likewise provides useful guidance for counsel, and
it demonstrates the importance of using the discovery process in
connection with expert witness evidence. In Kumho Tire, plaintiffs'
proposed expert was going to opine that the tire blowout, which
led to the minivan accident, occurred because of a manufacturer's
defect in the tire. 14 No one disputed that the blowout was caused'44
because the tire's tread separated from its carcass. The issue was
"whether the expert could reliably determine the cause of this tire's
separation."4 5  Plaintiffs' expert opined that it was a defect.146
137. See MINN. R. EVID. 702.
138. SeeDaubert, 509 U.S. at 591-92.
139. See General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 143 (1997).
140. See id.
141. See id. at 143-44.
142. See id. at 146-47. The animal studies were insufficient because the animals
had been injected with much larger doses of PCBs than plaintiff. See id. at 144. In
addition, the animals developed a different form of cancer than plaintiff. See id.
The epidemiological studies were insufficient because language within the studies
indicated a lack of evidence for concluding that exposure to PCBs caused lung
cancer. See id. at 146-47.
143. SeeKumho Tire Co., Ltd. v. Carmichael, 119 S. Ct. 1167, 1171 (1999).
144. See id. at 1172.
145. Id. at 1177.
146. See id. at 1172.
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However, the expert had testified at deposition that overdeflec-
tion 147 also causes separation and explained that there are four
symptoms of overdeflection. As the Court noted, the expert con-
firmed in his deposition that evidence of two of the four symptoms
appeared in the tire at issue. 149  Accordingly, the district court
found that the expert's testimony was unreliable. 150 Moreover, the
expert was unable to confirm how many miles the tire had traveled
and, although purporting to base his opinion on visual inspection
of the tire, he had not seen the tire until the morning of his deposi-
tion.151 Instead, his report was generated on the basis of photo-
graphs.152 The report was internally inconsistent with the opinion
expressed at the deposition and plaintiffs were not able to identify
any studies that relied upon the same methodology as their prof-
fered expert. 53 All of these factors led the Court to conclude that
the expert's opinion was properly excluded under Daubert as not
sufficiently reliable.15
As reflected in both Joiner and Kumho Tire, the "methods and
procedures" of the relevant field upon which an expert's opinions
are based must be identified and counsel must ensure that the
proffered opinions are in accord with these methods and proce-
dures. 155 For example, if the expert is going to opine in a sex dis-
147. See id. (stating that overdeflection occurs when a tire is underinflated or
driven while carrying too much weight causing heat which affects the bond be-
tween the tread and carcass).
148. See id. at 1178.
149. See id. at 1173.
150. See id. at 1178.
151. Seeid. at 1177.
152. See id.
153. See id. at 1177-79.
154. See id. at 1179. The Eighth Circuit applied a similar analysis in a recent
case. SeeJaurequi v. Carter Mfg. Co., Inc., 173 F.3d 1076 (8th Cir. 1999). In that
case, plaintiff alleged that design defects and inadequate warnings in a corn head
(a piece of equipment attached to a combine used when harvesting corn) manu-
factured by defendant caused plaintiffs injuries. See id. at 1079-80. Plaintiff sup-
ported his causation theory with the testimony of two engineers, which the trial
court excluded. See id. at 1081. The Eighth Circuit, citing Kumho Tire, held that
Daubert properly was applied to the inquiry even though the testimony was not sci-
entific. See id. at 1085. In sum, the court found that the experts' testimony was "ex-
tremely questionable" and that it was well within the district court's broad discre-
tion to exclude such testimony. See id. at 1084.
155. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). In Kumho
Tire, the methodology at issue was assessing tire failure through "visual or tactile
inspection of the tire." See Kumho Tire, 119 S. Ct. at 1178. The problem for plain-
tiffs was that their expert's opinion was inconsistent with the methodology he pur-
ported to follow. See id. In Joiner, the expert purported to rely upon animal studies
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crimination case-brought under the Minnesota Human Rights
Act (MHRA)-that sexual harassment caused plaintiff to suffer
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), the relevant "methods and
procedures" likely would be found in the American Psychiatric As-
sociation's diagnostic criteria. 56 Counsel should compare conclu-
sions of the expert with relevant diagnostic criteria to determine if
these criteria support the proffered opinion. According to DSM-
IV, a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder requires "exposure
to an extreme traumatic stressor involving direct personal experi-
ence of an event that involves actual or threatened death or serious
injury, or other threat to one's physical integrity.. .157 DSM-IV
lists specific examples which satisfy this definition. An expert
opining that exposure to something less, say, non-physical sexual
harassment, would be inconsistent with this criteria and arguably
would not satisfy Daubert's standard of reliability.
159
to support his conclusion. General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997).
The court however, concluded that "there [was] simply too great an analytical gap
between the data and the opinion proffered" for the opinion to be properly con-
sidered grounded in the methods and procedures of science. See id. (citing Turpin
v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 959 F.2d 1349, 1360 (6th Cir. 1992)).
156. See DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DIsoRDERs, xxvii (4th
ed. 1994) [hereinafter DSM-IV] ("These diagnostic criteria and the DSM-IV classi-
fication of mental disorders reflect a consensus of current formulations of evolving
knowledge in our field."); see also Roe v. Chater, 92 F.3d 672, 676 nn.4, 5 (8th Cir.
1996) (relying on DSM-IV); Henderson v. Sullivan, 930 F.2d 19, 20 n.2 (8th Cir.
1991) (relying on DSM-III); U.S. v. Watson, 893 F.2d 970, 972 n.2 (8th Cir. 1990)
(relying on DSM-III), vacated in part &y U.S. v. Holmes, 900 F.2d 1322 (8th Cir.
1990).
157. DSM-IV at 424.
158. See id. DSM-IV specifies examples of the type of traumatic event that is
necessary as "military combat, violent personal assault (sexual assault, physical at-
tack, robbery, mugging), being kidnapped, being taken hostage, terrorist attack,
torture, incarceration as a prisoner of war or in a concentration camp, natural or
manmade disasters, severe automobile accidents, or being diagnosed with a life-
threatening illness." Id.
159. Caselaw confirms that alleged sexual harassment is not sufficient to con-
stitute the stressor required to sustain a diagnosis of post traumatic stress disorder
(PTSD). See Shepherd v. American Broad. Co., Inc., 862 F. Supp. 486, 493-94
(D.D.C. 1994), vacated on other grounds, 62 F.3d 1469 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (holding that
PTSD claim based upon hostile environment sexual harassment fails as a matter of
law because conduct of which plaintiff complained-"inexcusable sexist and racist
jokes and insults"-did not constitute the requisite stressor); Broderick v. Ruder,
685 F. Supp. 1269, 1273 n.3 (D.D.C. 1988) (declining to accept plaintiffs expert's
opinion that she had PTSD from sexual harassment because "[h]is analogy relat-
ing the ... flood and the ... nightclub fire to plaintiff's reaction to a sexually hos-
tile work environment is not convincing"); see also Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp.,
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Counsel also must examine whether expert opinions satisfy
Daubert's requirement of "knowledge" for purposes of Rule 702.
That is, the opinions must be something more than unsupported
speculation. If the issue is causation, counsel must also ensure that
the expert has engaged in the requisite differential diagnosis or the
expert's testimony may not satisfy Daubert's "knowledge" require-
ment.' 60 If the expert in our MHRA case did not examine plaintiff
during the period that plaintiff supposedly was subject to the har-
assment, but instead was retained after the lawsuit, it may be diffi-
cult to argue that the opinion is "knowledge" under Rule 702. At
that late date, the conclusions would not be based upon objective
evidence; instead, the opinions would be based exclusively on in-
formation plaintiff chose to provide. Such opinions would be vul-
nerable to the argument that they are precisely the "subjective be-
lief' and "unsupported speculation" that the Court cautioned
against in Daubert.T
Once the first requirement in Rule 702 is addressed-the
opinion is based upon specialized knowledge-counsel must exam-
ine whether the testimony will assist the trier of fact. In this in-
quiry, counsel must ensure that the testimony is pertinent to an is-
sue in the case and is sufficiently connected to the issue so as to
160. "Courts have insisted time and time again that an expert may not give
opinion testimony to a jury regarding specific causation if the expert has not en-
gaged in the process of differential diagnosis-that is, the process of eliminating
other possible diagnoses." Rutigliano v. Valley Bus. Forms, 929 F. Supp. 779, 786
(D.N.J. 1996), affd, Valley Bus. Forms v. Graphic Fine Color, Inc., 118 F.3d 1577
(3rd Cir. 1997); see also Bennett v. PRC Pub. Sector Inc., 931 F. Supp. 484, 499
(S.D. Tex. 1996) ("[Proffered expert's] failure to meaningfully rule out or con-
sider any of these [multiple, well-recognized, non-work related potential causes] is
contrary to accepted methodology."); Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 43
F.3d 1311, 1319 (9th Cir. 1995) ( "[Proffered expert] offers no tested or testable
theory to explain how, from this limited information, he was able to eliminate all
other potential causes of birth defects.").
161. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., 509 U.S. 579, 590 (1993). The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has found on numerous occasions that such
speculative opinion evidence should be excluded. See, e.g., Wright v. Willamette
Indus., Inc. 91 F.3d 1105, 1108 (8th Cir. 1996) (stating that testimony of proposed
expert on supposed cause of plaintiffs' injuries "was simply speculation" and
should have been excluded; jury verdict reversed); Gier v. Educational Serv. Unit
No. 16, 66 F.3d 940, 944 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial court properly ex-
cluded expert testimony that did not meet standards articulated in Daubert); Pestel
v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 64 F.3d 382, 384-85 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that the trial
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assist the jury in resolving the issue. 62
Even if the expert testimony is sufficiently reliable and helpful
to satisfy Rule 702, counsel also must assess whether the proffered
testimony may be excluded under Rule 403. As the Court noted in
Daubert:
Rule 403 permits the exclusion of relevant evidence "if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger
of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues or misleading
the jury. . . ." Judge Weinstein has explained: "Expert evi-
dence can be both powerful and quite misleading because
of the difficulty in evaluating it. Because of this risk, the
judge in weighing possible prejudice against probative
force under Rule 403 of the present rules exercises more• . ,,163
control over experts than over lay witness.
Many Minnesota decisions examine Rule 403 in the area of
admissibility of expert testimony independently from any examina-
tion of Daubert's interpretation of the requirements of Rule 702.1
64
As the comment to Minnesota's Rule 403 notes, the rule "creates a
balancing test" but "favors the admission of relevant evidence by
requiring a determination that its probative value be 'substantially'
outweighed by the dangers listed in the rule" before the evidence
162. For an example of expert testimony that satisfies the first requirement of
Rule 702, but is inadmissible because it is unhelpful to the jury, see Daubert, 509
U.S. at 591.
163. Id. at 595 (citations omitted).
164. See, e.g, Bixler v. State, 582 N.W.2d 252, 256 (Minn. 1998), cert. denied 119
S. Ct. 620 (1998) (ruling that testimony not admissible because jury was capable of
assessing defendant's propensity to please authority figures without expert psycho-
logical testimony on the subject); State v. Grecinger, 569 N.W.2d 189, 196-97
(Minn. 1997) (holding that defendant was not unfairly prejudiced under Rule 403
by admission of expert testimony on battered women syndrome as long as the tes-
timony was properly limited so that the expert was not allowed to "suggest that the
complainant was battered, was truthful or fit the battered woman syndrome.
Likewise, the expert may not express an opinion as to whether the defendant was
in fact a batterer."); State v. Borchardt, 478 N.W.2d 757, 761-62 (Minn. 1991)
(holding that expert testimony on male sexual victimization was properly excluded
under Rule 403 because the expert's theory "was based on a relatively undevel-
oped theory, but his status as an expert witness likely would have caused the jury to
accept the theory as reliable and established"); Sorensen v. Maski, 361 N.W.2d 498,
500 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that opinion testimony of accident recon-
structionist as to speed, based upon location of appellant's vehicle and 121-foot
skid mark was properly admissible under Rule 403 because "[t]here was nothing
particularly confusing or misleading about this testimony").
2000]
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will be ruled inadmissible. To be properly prepared on the issue
of admissibility of expert testimony, counsel must not ignore the
Rule 403 inquiry.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Daubert trilogy provides a uniform approach for assessing
expert testimony that does not allow trial courts to relinquish their
responsibility for determining admissibility of expert opinion. This
standard should be adopted in Minnesota. The role of trial judges
in the 1990s can be analogized as making a trip from the calm, sta-S 166
ble plains to the rigorous and intimidating mountains. The Min-
nesota Supreme Court should give the Minnesota trial court bench
the opportunity and responsibility to make this trip.
165. See MINN. R. EVID. 403 committee comment.
166. See Jack B. Weinstein, Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence is Sound; It
Should Not Be Amended, 138 F.R.D. 631, 633 (1991) ("The passivity of the plains is
where we have been. There the lawyers and the adversarial system took almost all
responsibility for presenting scientific proof. Now we judges are urged to move
into the more arrogant mountains of administration, control and the responsibil-
ity for expert witnesses.").
[Vol. 26:1
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